General (retired) Jean-Luc Jacquement offers a strategic reflection on lines of defense and intermodal trajectories across various geographies. In his text, he examines contemporary military logistics through the lens of multiple lines—geographical, geopolitical, legal, and immaterial—that structure, hinder, or redefine operations in a globalized world. Logistical flows—whether human, material, financial, or informational—travel along land, air, and sea routes. These pathways are governed by complex normative frameworks and face major strategic constraints, particularly in times of crisis or conflict, such as in Ukraine or the Red Sea.
Cyberspace has emerged as a new dimension in the theater of operations. General Jacquement illustrates these dynamics with the examples of the French military withdrawals from Afghanistan (2012–2014) and the Sahel region (2022–2023), showing how geography, sovereignty relations, and bilateral negotiations make intermodal logistics both challenging and essential. These cases highlight the crucial role of straits, ports, air corridors, and digital infrastructures in the deployment and withdrawal of forces. He reminds us that military logistics evolves within a space of unstable contours: a framework for geography, an issue for geopolitics, a stage for geostrategy, and a fluid domain for geoeconomics.
On April 17 and 18, the Institute of Advanced Studies of Nantes organized a workshop “Ocean Imaginary - Traces, Lines and Limits”. The originality of this workshop – from my point of view – was based on the great diversity of speakers and topics addressed, and the richness of exchanges, thus opening up unsuspected horizons and prospects for future exchanges.
For my part, I dealt with the subject of lines of defense and intermodal trajectories, endeavouring to demonstrate, through concrete examples, the complexity and permanence of interactions between geographical lines, geopolitics, geostrategics and logistical flows to support our military operations.
Schematically, military logistics flows are divided into physical flows (personnel, resources and equipment), financial flows and information flows.
These flows are both inbound and outbound as a result of staff handover every 4 or 6 months following the operation or in case of final withdrawal when the operation is completed.
The physical flows take lines of communication that constitute umbilical cords between France and the areas of engagement of our forces.
All routes are used: land, air and sea, most often with a combination of modes. But all these paths are interspersed with lines, visible or invisible, which constitute as many obstacles or technical, administrative, political difficulties to overcome.
The land routes cross well visible lines : the borders between states.
The air and sea routes cross very real but not visible lines, both horizontal and vertical.
All these lines are the expression of the sovereignty of States, a cardinal principle in international relations.
In times of conflict or crisis, lines of communication are a prime target for the adversary. They quickly become a strategic issue and require significant resources to secure them.
Examples include the Battle of the Atlantic during World War II, the Taliban attacks on tanker or vehicle convoys for NATO in Pakistan between 2009 and 2011, and currently the Ukrainian and Russian attacks on the road, air, naval and railway infrastructures of the enemy, or those of the Houtis on the ships crossing the strait of Bab al-Mandeb.
Immaterial fields are not spared. Thus, cyber threats have become permanent and can seriously affect infrastructure – including logistics – services and the proper functioning of institutions.
Cyber-space now links the land, naval and air dimensions as an important war dimension. We see that every week with the Russian-Ukrainian conflict with countries that support Ukraine or between Iran and Israel. Artificial intelligence is now increasing the sophistication of cyber attacks.
The use of these channels of communication is subject to treaties and regulations to which our military logistics flows are subject.
Among these, the Chicago Convention of 7 December 1944, relating to international civil aviation, lays down the principle of complete and exclusive sovereignty of each State over airspace over its territory. The vertical limit of airspace has not been defined by an international convention. In practice, the States refer to the so-called Kármán line, which represents an altitude of about 100 km, located well beyond the space controlled by air navigation providers (20 km altitude).
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, known as Montego Bay, defines or specifies the different maritime areas, differentiating those under the jurisdiction of States and those located beyond national jurisdictions. Maritime space is 70% of the world’s surface, 90% of trade and 98% of digital flows through more than 450 submarine cables, all vital lines that criss-cross the bottom of the oceans.
In order to allow the movement of dangerous goods between countries, regulations on the transport of dangerous goods (TDG) are mainly international. It is based on various international regulations, including :
- the RID Regulation for rail transport;
- the ADR agreement for road transport;
- the European ADN agreement for inland waterway transport;
- Shipping codes and collections for TDG in parcels and bulk for shipping;
- the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air.
Sending equipment to foreign locations requires that the military be able to cross borders safely. During the transit of troops and armaments, the governments of the countries concerned request a declaration from the Ministry of Armed Forces between three and six weeks in advance, depending on the country. When the material is shipped in containers, the army proceeds as a private company with a declaration (form FR 302 which is equivalent to the single administrative document – DAU - when crossing the borders).
The major maritime trade routes are subject to the geography of the straits and interoceanic canals (Suez and Panama). They also cross piracy zones. Securing these roads is therefore a vital issue for many countries. France is contributing to this, for example by fighting piracy, particularly in the Gulf of Guinea and the Indian Ocean, or by participating in maritime security in the face of attacks by the Houtis in the southern Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Bab-el-Mandeb strait.
Moreover, maritime areas are contested by some States. Thus, in 4 years, the coral reef of Fiery Cross (Spratleys Islands) was completely developed by China to accommodate a landing strip for large aircraft, several port and military infrastructure. The same goes for the reefs of Mischief Reef and Subi Reef. Indeed, China considers that almost all of this zone, considered rich in hydrocarbons, falls under its sovereignty, to the detriment of the neighbouring countries : the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei. On 16 July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague disavowed Beijing in this dispute against the Philippines in the China Sea. China has stated that it does not recognize the authority of this court.
Land borders are also shifting lines. Thus, the political configuration of the European continent was marked by stability during the Cold War from 1947 to 1990: there was no border change or state creation during this period. On the other hand, it has been reshaped several times over the past three decades as a result of German reunification, the breakup of the USSR, Yugoslavia and the split of Czechoslovakia.
This situation therefore makes military material crossings in Europe more complex. These questions of "military mobility" have been on the European agenda since 2017, the date of a first action plan. On 30 January 2024, Germany, the Netherlands and Poland signed an agreement to move people and equipment faster and more efficiently from deep-sea ports in the North Sea to the eastern borders of Europe. NATO also created the Joint Support and Facilitation Command (JSEC), which is responsible for the logistics and mobility of troops in Europe.
Geography and geopolitics therefore impose their constraints and military planning is no exception.
The withdrawal of the French contingent from Afghanistan and the Sahelian strip are perfect examples.
The withdrawal from Afghanistan, carried out gradually between 2012 and 2014, concerned 4150 men, 1150 vehicles, 11 helicopters, drones, 6 fighter jets, 2600 containers and 380 tons of ammunition.
The French apparatus was divided between KANDAHAR (Air Force Detachment) and mainly the Kabul region including the Surobi district and the Kapisa province.
An Air Force detachment was stationed in DOUCHAMBE, Tajikistan.
Afghanistan is a landlocked country with limited (road) or almost non-existent (rail) infrastructure. 80% of the country has an altitude greater than 1000 meters which reduces the carrying capacity of aircraft up to 50% in summer.
The southern route through Pakistan (the cheapest) was permanently blocked from December 2011 for security and diplomatic reasons. The Dutch were able to use this route in 2010 for their departure from the province of Uruzgan.
The slow pace of negotiations and the requirements for the opening of the Uzbek and Kazakh roads to the north did not allow full use of these roads. The Kazakh authorities expected France to finance part of the infrastructure improvements at CHYMKENT airport.
The choice was quickly imposed.
The vast majority of cargo leaving Afghanistan did so from KABUL airport. Only the 380 tons of ammunition – which were not allowed to pass through this airport – were shipped from the US air base at BAGRAM.
For the reasons mentioned above, the exit was therefore made in direct flights to France for all personnel and 15% of the cargo, and in multimodal (air, sea) for 85% of the cargo. The plane/boat load rupture occurred in the United Arab Emirates.
The second example concerns the withdrawal of the Sahelian strip between 2022 and 2023. This withdrawal was made in three stages following successive coups in Mali, then in Burkina Faso and finally in Niger, these three regimes having asked France to leave their territory.
Mali’s withdrawal took place in three successive phases from February to August 2022:
- Closure of the three bases of TESSALIT, KIDAL and TIMBUKTU, comprising 600 men, 140 vehicles and 430 containers. From 13 to 15 November 2021, two A400 M Atlas aircraft made twelve rotations at a rate of four per day between TESSALIT and GAO. These air movements carried 190 tonnes of cargo, including 18 vehicles.
- Closure of the two bases of GOSSI and MENAKA, a thousand men, 210 vehicles and 1130 containers. For these first two phases, everything was brought back by land, in about twenty convoys, to GAO.
- Closure of the GAO base, the largest French base in West Africa.
1800 vehicles and 4800 containers are first transported by land to NIAMEY in Niger at 400 kms.
For strategic routes, 300 flights of strategic transport aircraft (C17, IL 76, AN124 and A400M) carried personnel, cargo and sensitive material to ISTRES military airfield bypassing Algeria whose airspace was closed to French aircraft on 3 October 2021.
80% of freight and vehicles are transported from NIAMEY to the ports of ABIDJAN in Côte d'Ivoire and COTONOU in Benin. Five rotations of chartered ship are then necessary to repatriate everything on the military port of TOULON.
Burkina Faso’s withdrawal took place in three weeks in February 2023. The 400 men of the special forces of the Task Force SABRE leave the base of KAMBOINSIN (OUAGADOUGOU).
Personnel, freight and vehicles are transported to NIAMEY in Niger, 500 km away, by road and air.
Finally, on September 24, 2023, Emmanuel Macron announced the withdrawal of the French military from Niger for the end of December.
The two bases of OUALLAM and TABAREY BAREY (area of the three borders) are first closed. The 400 soldiers, vehicles, equipment and resources are repatriated to Niamey by land.
Then it is the base of NIAMEY where 1100 French soldiers are stationed.
For the strategic routes, 145 flights of strategic transport aircraft (C17, IL 76, AN124 and A 400M) transported from N'DJAMENA personnel, cargo and sensitive material to ISTRES still bypassing Algeria.
The border with BENIN has been closed since the coup in Niger and therefore access to the port of COTONOU. Ditto for BURKINA FASO and access to the port of ABIDJAN in Côte d'Ivoire.
Niger prohibits its airspace except for special exemptions. Personnel are flown from NIAMEY to France. Part of the freight is also transported from NIAMEY to France or from NIAMEY to N'DJAMENA then France.
Most of the freight is transported by land from NIAMEY to N'DJAMENA (1700 kms). The logistics flow will then be entrusted to private companies between N'DJAMENA and DOUALA in CAMEROON (1700 kilometers).
Two rotations of chartered ship are necessary to repatriate everything on military port of TOULON.
To conclude, we can say that political geography considers space as a framework, geopolitics considers space as an issue and by deduction, geostrategy considers space as a theatre.
Geoeconomics questions the relationship between power and space, but a «virtual» or fluid space in the sense that its limits are constantly moving, that is to say a space freed from the territorial and physical borders characteristic of geopolitics.
The logistical support of our military operations must deal with its various frameworks and spaces and with the countless lines, visible or invisible, that characterize them.
