



# FOURTH-CENTURY ATHENS AT WAR: AFTER CLAUDE MOSSÉ

An International Conference

**4-6 July 2023**

**The Nantes Institute  
for Advanced Study  
France**

**ORGANISERS**

**David M. Pritchard** (IEA de Nantes/Queensland)

**Ian Worthington** (Macquarie)

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## WELCOME TO OUR CONFERENCE IN NANTES

Welcome to *Fourth-Century Athens at War: After Claude Mossé*. This international conference is taking place at the Nantes Institute for Advanced Study (France) from 4 to 6 July 2023. This major scientific event brings together more than 30 ancient historians from France and across the world. The main co-organiser of the conference is David M. Pritchard (Nantes/Queensland), who can be contacted at any time on 07 87 47 41 97 (mobile telephone) or at [david.pritchard@iea-nantes.fr](mailto:david.pritchard@iea-nantes.fr).

Ancient historians have traditionally understood the fourth century BC as period of general decline. Claude Mossé (figure 1) – the pioneering French ancient historian – did the most to promote this understanding. Her book *La Fin de la démocratie athénienne* argued that Athens never recovered from the Peloponnesian War, falling into a grave economic and political crisis. Mossé also held that this crisis had a clear military dimension. Athens after 404 BC was much weaker militarily and could not stop the conquests of Philip II and Alexander the Great.

In introducing social history into the study of politics, Mossé was truly innovative. It was not without reason that *La Fin de la démocratie athénienne* framed for decades how ancient historians understood fourth-century Athens. More recently, however, there has been an ever-growing calling into question of this traditional understanding. Sixty years after Mossé's first book, ancient historians probably now agree that postwar Athens did recover economically and politically. In spite of this, we still do not have a thorough reassessment of what *La Fin de la démocratie athénienne* argued about how fourth-century Athens had performed militarily. This international conference aims to undertake this reassessment. In doing so, it will put the study of Athenian warmaking after 404 on a completely new footing.

Claude Mossé died on 12 December 2022 at the age of 97 years. After *La Fin de la démocratie athénienne*, she wrote many more books and was a pioneering figure in the teaching of Ancient History in France. Jean-Pierre Vernant himself rightly recognised Mossé as a leading figure in the Paris School. Our conference in Nantes is another scholarly homage to this great French historian of classical Greece.




Figure 1: Claude Mossé in 2000

## GENERAL INFORMATION

The conference is taking place in the Nantes Institute for Advanced Study (France). It officially begins at 10 am on Tuesday 4 July and finishes at 4 pm on Thursday 6 July. There is a private dinner reserved for paper-givers and session-chairs on Monday 3 July. The Institute's address is 5 Allée Jacques Berque. The sessions of the conference will be on the ground floor of the Institute. Lunches and dinners will take place in the Institute's Club on the first floor. The official conference hotel is Apparthôtel Residhome, which is at 3 Allée Jacques Berque. The Institute and the hotel are part of one building complex on the northern-most bank of the Loire River in Nantes. The complex sits where the Erdre River flows into the Madeleine branch of the Loire (figure 2). The Institute and the hotel are 700 metres to the south of the main train station in Nantes and close to the city's celebrated castle.

The conference's registration fee is 160€. This fee covers day-to-day catering as well as the conference dinner on Wednesday 5 July. Apparthôtel Residhome, which is a 4-star hotel, is offering conference participants the special rate of 115€ per night. There are several less expensive hotels directly to the north of Nantes's main train station. Nantes is 2 hours by train from Paris and has an airport that is 10 kilometres to the south of the city centre. The shuttle bus between Nantes's airport and its main train station runs every 20 minutes and costs 9€ per trip.



**Figure 2: The location of the Nantes Institute for Advanced Study**

All participants in the conference will be making their own dinner arrangements on Tuesday 4 July. This is a chance for small groups of conference-delegates to share an evening meal together. In the same building complex as the Institute and the hotel is La Passerelle de Marcel, which is at 7 Allée Jacques Berque. Located on the Loire, this brasserie offers set menus of 28€ for 2 courses and 34€ for 3 courses. For those wanting a more traditional French brasserie, there is the magnificent La Cigale, which was founded in 1895. It is located at 4 Place Graslin. Nantes now has a whole series of restaurants offering *un menu dégustation*, which is a set menu of 6 or more courses. Two of them are great value for money, each offering such a menu for only 59€. Pickles, run by a chef from Newcastle-upon-Tyne, can be found at 2 Rue du Marais, while Restaurant ICI is at 1 Rue Léon Blum. Nantes is full of restaurants and cafés for those on a tighter budget. A nice option is Pizzeria Pinocchio, which is at 31 Rue St Léonard. You can book all these restaurants online or via email. It is always a good idea to make a diner reservation in Nantes.

Most paper givers at our conference have a 1-hour slot. The exceptions include the introductory talks by Pierre-Etienne Kenfack and David M. Pritchard as well as the closing remarks by Ian Worthington (nos. 1-2 and 20). Each of these three talks will be around 10 minutes. In addition, Mischa Piekosz has a 30-minute slot (no. 10) and Anne Schnapp-Gourbeillon (no. 16) a 45-minute one. Paper-givers will be leaving one third of their slots for open discussion. Session-chairs will be keeping their introductions of speakers as brief as possible. They are going to make sure that sessions follow the program and that speakers leave as much time as possible for open discussion. All sessions will be recorded for publication as podcasts after our conference. Papers can be delivered and questioned asked in English or French. Bilingual participants will be there to help everyone get across the language barrier. For the same crossing, all papers are being circulated among conference participants before we meet in Nantes.

### FINANCIAL SPONSORS

The Australian Research Council (ARC) is the principal financial sponsor of *Fourth-Century Democracy at War: After Claude Mossé*. The other financial sponsors of our international conference are the Nantes Institute for Advanced Study, the Estate of the Late Nicholas Anthony Aroney (Australia), Macquarie University (Australia) and the University of Queensland (Australia). The conference is an integral part of the ARC-funded project that David M. Pritchard and Ian Worthington are currently co-directing (grant no. DP200101352). The project, whose title is ‘From Where the Fine Warships Come’: Democratic Athens at War’, investigates Athenian warmaking from the sixth to the fourth centuries BC. Under the aegis of this ARC project, Mischa Piekosz of the University of Queensland is writing a PhD thesis on warfare in sixth-century Athens. Mischa is speaking about his doctoral research at our conference in Nantes.

### CONFERENCE THEME

French ancient historians were largely responsible for promulgating the traditional view of fourth-century Athens. They agreed that this state peaked in the fifth century, when it dominated Greece militarily, perfected democracy and was a cultural innovator. By contrast, they held fourth-century Athens in contempt. For example, Cornelius Castoriadis and Nicole Loraux thought the Athenians after 404 were simply incapable of political reform and literary innovation.

Before *La Fin de la démocratie athénienne*, French scholars had found the reason for this postwar decline in politics. Mossé, who was still a traditional Marxist in the 1950s and 1960s, located it instead in economics. Her *La Fin de la démocratie athénienne* argued that the fifth-century empire had suppressed the longstanding class-struggle among the Athenians by giving thousands of them farmland overseas. When they were forced home after the defeat, they swelled the ranks of a huge underclass because the Peloponnesian War had destroyed Attica’s agriculture and urban economy. As they became poorer, Mossé argued, the Athenian people were no longer willing to contribute to public life. *La Fin de la démocratie athénienne* concluded that a reawakened class-struggle had destroyed the capacity of Athenian democracy to resolve grave collective problems.

Mossé was probably the first ancient historian to offer a comprehensive account of fourth-century Athens at war. She argued that the Athenians increasingly refused to serve in wars, leaving the fighting of them to mercenaries. They also refused to raise internal taxes to pay for these foreign troops, preferring to exploit as much as possible the Greek states in their new league. The Athenian people licensed their generals to engage in piracy and pillaging, which made it harder for their state to create viable military coalitions. By asking generals to do more independently, fourth-century Athens ultimately lost control of them. *La Fin de la démocratie athénienne* concluded that postwar

Athenians could no longer deploy adequate fleets nor armies. For Mossé, it was no great surprise that they ultimately failed to stop Macedonia's conquest of the Greek World.

Scholarship of recent decades has called into question the traditional understanding of postwar Athens. It is now clear that the Peloponnesian War had much less of an impact on the rural and urban economies. Fourth-century Athenians were no less committed to political reform and cultural innovation. It is true that this revisionist historiography also challenges elements of Mossé's assessment of Athenian warfare. Leonhard Burckhardt continues to show that Athenians after 404 still regularly served in the armed forces. Philip Harding has reminded us how fourth-century Athens quickly became a regional military power. George Cawkwell has confirmed that it could normally launch adequate fleets. In spite of these new findings, we still do not have a comprehensive reassessment of fourth-century Athens at war. The aim of our conference in Nantes is to draw this new detailed picture of this military record.

*Fourth-Century Athens at War: After Claude Mossé* considers the reforms that the Athenian people enacted in relation to different military branches. It also analyses how each military corps performed in actual campaigns. Adam Schwartz is doing this for hoplites, Jérémy Clément for horsemen, Vincent Gabrielsen for the navy and Nick Sekunda for light troops.

The conference also reconsiders different general aspects of Athenian wars after 404. Mossé criticised fourth-century Athenians for doing too little to control their generals. Joseph Roisman and Aggelos Kapellos are reviewing this vital principal-agent relationship after the Peloponnesian War. Postwar Athens actually repeatedly reformed the financing of war. Focussing on the early fourth century, Annabel Florence is reassessing the effectiveness of these reforms. Fifth-century Athens had had unprecedented fortifications and had been Greece's leading besieger of cities. Julien Baldacini is weighing up whether it maintained this record after 404.

The conference investigates how postwar Athens fared in specific wars. Marie Durnerin is looking again at what it got out of the Corinthian War. There is still a debate about whether the league that fourth-century Athens created was more or less exploitative than the fifth-century empire. In resolving this debate, Sviatoslav Dmitriev will focus on the Athenian wars of the 360s and the 350s. For Mossé, not stopping Philip II was the definitive proof that postwar Athens was a military failure. But other ancient historians have argued that no Greek city-state could have ever stopped the much larger regional state that Philip II had skilfully created. Ian Worthington is adjudicating this central debate about fourth-century Greece. In doing so, he is focussing on the Athenian wars against Philip II in the 350s and the 340s. For her part, Lara O'Sullivan is looking closely at how Athens fought the Lamian War of the 320s.

The warmaking of Athens after 404 did not happen in a vacuum. *Fourth-century Athens at War: After Claude Mossé* concludes by exploring its performance in other public domains. After the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians introduced an enormous number of political and economic reforms. James Kierstead considers whether the goal of these political reforms was to make the democracy more or less democratic. For her part, Dorothea Rohde is considering what roles the different decisions of the *dēmos* played in the general economic recovery of Athens after the Peloponnesian War. French historiography especially has taken the supposedly poor quality of fourth-century literature as further evidence of a general Athenian decline. Lucy Jackson is showing how comic and tragic poets after 404 generally continued to push the boundaries of theatre, while public oratory developed at a truly staggering pace.


*Fourth-Century Athens at War: After Claude Mossé* is also an occasion to reflect on the legacy of a truly great figure in French historiography of ancient Greece. In particular, Annie Schnapp-

Gourbeillon is going to discuss on her pivotal role in Paris School and her pioneering work as a teacher of ancient Greek history.

### PUBLICATION

Cambridge University Press has clearly expressed an interest in the publication of our conference papers as a volume. Our book will be co-edited by David M. Pritchard and Ian Worthington. Paper-givers are going to revise their papers on the basis of feedback from the conference in Nantes. The deadline for the first submission of book-chapters to the co-editors will be July 2024. The maximum extent of each chapter, excluding bibliography, is 8000 words. The co-editors will finalise their first reports on all chapters by December 2024. Authors will have until July 2025 to revise their chapters. The second reports of the co-editors will be finalised by December 2025, with the final chapters due back to them by July 2025. The aim is to publish *Fourth-Century Athens at War: After Claude Mossé* at the end of 2025. It will thus probably appear with a print publication date of 2026.

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**Figure 3: Australian soldiers admire the view from the Erechtheum in April 1941.**

## PROGRAM

Monday 3 July 2023

- 7.15 pm Early Conference Registration in the Institute's Club
- 7.30 pm Private Drinks for Paper-Givers and Session-Chairs on the River Terrace of the Club
- 8 pm Private Dinner for Paper-Givers and Session-Chairs in the Institute's Club
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Tuesday 4 July 2023

- 9.30 am Late Conference Registration outside the Conference Room
- 10 am **Session 1: Military Branches I**  
Session-Chair: Lara O'Sullivan (Western Australia)
1. Opening Remarks by Pierre-Etienne Kenfack (Nantes/Yaoundé) **(in French)**
  2. David M. Pritchard (Nantes/Queensland) 'Fourth-Century Athens at War' **(in French)**
- Short Pause
3. Vincent Gabrielsen (Copenhagen) 'The Athenian Navy in the Fourth Century BC: Restoration, Incrementation and Transformation'
- 11.30 am Morning Tea outside the Conference Room
- 12 pm **Session 2: Military Branches II**  
Session-Chair: Hanna Roisman (Colby)
4. Jérémy Clément (Paris) 'Debating Reforms to the Cavalry in Fourth-Century Athens' **(in French)**
- 1 pm Lunch in the Institute's Club
- 2 pm **Session 3: Military Branches III**  
Session-Chair: Marie Durnerin (Toulouse)
5. Adam Schwartz (Copenhagen) 'Pass it on Not Diminished, But Greater and More Powerful': Athenian Hoplites in the Fourth Century BC'
- Short Pause
6. Nicholas Sekunda (Gdańsk) 'Athenian Peltasts in the Fourth-Century BC'
- 4.10 pm Afternoon Tea outside the Conference Room
- 4.40 pm **Session 4: Military Practices I**  
Session-Chair: Ian Worthington (Macquarie)
7. Joseph Roisman (Colby) 'Generals and Generalship in the Fourth-Century Orators'
- Short Pause
8. Aggelos Kapellos (Athens/Ioannina) 'From Villain to Hero: Conon's Victory at Cnidus in the Attic Orators'
- 6.50 pm Close of the Conference for the Day
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## Wednesday 5 July 2023

### 9.50 am **Session 5: Military Practices II**

Session-Chair: Dorothea Rohde (Bielefeld)

9. Annabel Florence (Queensland) 'Athens after the Defeat: Financing Wars from 399 to 369 BC'

Short Pause

10. Mischa Piekosz (Queensland) '*Naukraroi* and *Naukrariai*: The Purpose of One of the Oldest Athenian Institutions'

### 11.30 am **Morning Tea outside the Conference Room**

### 12 noon **Session 6: Military Practices III**

Session-Chair: Pierre-Emmanuel Lebonnois (Nantes)

11. Julien Baldacini (Nantes/Paris) 'From the 'Sound of the Flute' to the 'Death of the City': Reflections on Athenian Fortifications from 404 to 322 BC' (**in French**)

### 1 pm **Lunch in the Institute's Club**

### 2 pm **Session 7: Fourth-Century Wars I**

Session-Chair: Adam Schwartz (Copenhagen)

12. Marie Durnerin (Toulouse) 'Was There a Revival of Athenian Hegemony in the Corinthian War?' (**in French**)

Short Pause

13. Sviatoslav Dmitriev (Ball State) 'From Cadmea to Chaeronea: The Second Athenian League and Athenian Imperialism after the Peloponnesian War'

### 4.10 pm **Afternoon Tea outside the Conference Room**

### 4.40 pm **Session 8: Fourth-Century Wars II**

Session-Chair: Annabel Florence (Queensland)

14. Ian Worthington (Macquarie) 'The Athenian War Effort against Philip II'

Short Pause

15. Lara O'Sullivan (Western Australia) 'Athenian Military Performance after 338 BC: The Case-Study of the Lamian War'

### 6.50 pm **Close of the Sessions for the Day**

### 7.30 pm **Conference Drinks for All Participants on the River Terrace of the Institute's Club**

### 8 pm **Conference Dinner for All Participants in the Insitute's Club**

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**Thursday 6 July 2023**

**10.15 am Session 9: Claude Mossé**

Session-Chair: Lucie Thévenet (Nantes)

16. Anne Schnapp-Gourbeillon (Paris) 'The Beautiful Career-Path of Claude Mossé' (in French)

**11 am Morning Tea outside the Conference Room**

**11.30 am Session 10: Comparative Performances I**

Session-Chair: Mischa Piekosz (Queensland)

17. James Kierstead (Wellington) 'The Evolution of Athenian Democracy after 404 BC'

**12.30 pm Lunch in the Institute's Club**

**1.30 pm Session 11: Comparative Performances II**

Session-Chair: Jérémy Clément (Paris)

18. Dorothea Rohde (Bielefeld) 'More than a Recovery: Political Decisions and Economic Improvements in Postwar Athens'

Short Pause

19. Lucy Jackson (Durham) 'Literary Itineraries: Athenian Soft Power and Cultural Expansion in the Fourth Century BC'

20. Closing Remarks by Ian Worthington

**3.40 pm The Close of the Conference**

**4 pm Closing Drinks for All Participants on the River Terrace of the Institute's Club**



**Figure 4: British soldiers take in the Erechtheum in October 1944.**

## ABSTRACTS

**Julien Baldacini (Nantes/Paris)**

### **From the 'Sound of the Flute' to the 'Death of the City': Reflections on Athenian Fortifications from 404 to 322 BC**

The defeat of 404 BC saw Athens experience a wide range of the reprisals that were the common lot of a defeated city in classical Greece. Among the most severe was the destruction of the city's walls, which gave concrete form to the loss of autonomy that Athens had now suffered. Xenophon memorably made out that this destruction was a joyful event, which, according to him, was accompanied by the 'sound of the flute' and marked a new era for Greece as a whole. These reprisals aside, the fourth century inaugurated for the Athenians significant changes in strategy and conceptual thinking about home territory. With the defeat and especially the loss of the naval empire, an about-turn takes place in Athenian grand strategy. In the face of the obvious limits of Pericles's strategy during the Peloponnesian War, Athens began to transform how it used fortifications – a transformation that would take up the whole of the fourth century. Traumatized as they were by the defeat of 404 BC, the Athenians thus moved from a strategy of abandoning their territory to one that prioritized its protection. This move entailed a program of refortifying Attica itself as well as other defensive works whose aim was to keep the enemy well outside the frontiers. All this was an obvious departure from Periclean strategy in the Peloponnesian War. From this refocussing on home territory emerged not just new military strategies but also significant political and ideological changes. The end point is the 'death of the city', which Lycurgus understood to be the abandoning of Attica by the Athenians. After the defeat of 322, this was shockingly realized in part by Antipater, who forcibly resettled many citizens in the Chalcidice.

**Jérémy Clément (Paris)**

### **Debating Reforms to the Cavalry in Fourth-Century Athens**

In the mid-fifth century, Athenian leaders judged it essential for the Athenian *arkhē* ('empire') to have a cavalry-corps. By 438 BC at the latest, they had convinced the *dēmos* ('people') to expand the corps from 300 to 1000 horsemen. Their decision, of which Pericles had probably been the main advocate, was celebrated in the Parthenon frieze, which focussed on this greatly expanded cavalry-corps. In order to find the 1000 recruits, the *dēmos* also agreed to subsidize their *hippotrophia* ('horse-raising') through a range of subsidies, which cost a staggering 100 talents per year. Because this represented only a tenth of the public income that Athens had in the 430s, there was broad consensus that it was affordable. The defeat of 404 shattered this consensus about the 'imperial' cavalry. Some Athenians asked whether the state could still afford 1000 horsemen, while others argued that public subsidisation of them at such a level was no longer justified in view of the fact that the corps had backed the oligarchic regime of the Thirty Tyrants. In the decades that followed, the corps, at times, struggled to find 1000 recruits, often performed poorly on campaign and was the target of attacks in the law-courts. There was also political debate about whether the corps should be completely reformed or maintained in the form that it had reached by 438. Such debate also figured in the private treatises of intellectuals, such as Xenophon. Debating cavalry-reforms came to an end only at the close of the fourth century, when Athens after the Lamian War drastically reduced the number of recruits in its cavalry-corps.

**Sviatoslav Dmitriev (Ball State)**

**From Cadmea to Chaeronea: The Second Athenian League and Athenian Imperialism after the Peloponnesian War**

This paper re-assesses the ongoing debate on the nature of the Second Athenian League, which oscillates between two extremes: either it was an empire from the beginning or it never was. Today the majority view is probably that the League was eventually transformed into a new Athenian Empire, even if the date, the details and the reasons behind such a transformation continue to be vigorously disputed. This reassessment is based on a re-examination of the evidence for the nature of the Aristoteles decree and the status of Athenian allies from 378 to 338, for Athens's collection of allied *suntaxeis* ('contributions') and for its establishment of cleruchies, governors and garrisons. The paper also considers the reasons for, and the consequences of, the Social War as well as the evolution of Athenian foreign policy in connection with Philip II. The paper argues that the Second Athenian League developed as Athens's tool not only to contest Sparta's and then Thebes's claims to dominance in the Greek world, but also to suppress regional hegemonies. Athens's inability to quell local centres of power and to resist the rising threat of Macedonia made her acquiesce to cooperating with the Theban Federation and other regional hegemonies in the late 340s and early 330s, thus largely undoing the League's original purpose even before its ultimate disintegration.

**Marie Durnerin (Toulouse)**

**Was There a Revival of Athenian Hegemony in the Corinthian War?**

The Corinthian War saw Athens join a coalition that was fighting against Spartan hegemony. A common first impression of this ten-year conflict is that the Athenian city-state was no longer in a position to play a leading role. If we follow only Xenophon's famous account, the Corinthian War made plain from the beginning the immense power of Sparta, which won crushing victories at the Nemean River and Coronea, and, later, the crucial role that Persia would now play in the relations between Greek city-states. Nevertheless, this conflict, like the Peloponnesian War, was made up of several distinct phases, for which we possess a diverse range of sources. Going beyond Xenophon allows us to see that the Corinthian War ended up being a positive turning-point in Athenian history. In this conflict, Athens was able to free itself from the Lacedaemonian yoke and to begin to rebuild a multilateral military alliance. The Corinthian War gave several Athenian military leaders the opportunity to become famous and to implement innovative military practices, such as, for example, Conon, who commanded the Persian fleet, and Iphicrates with his renowned peltasts. These leaders, it appears, were the first to be honoured with public statues at home, which in itself represented a significant change in the honorific practices of Athenian democracy. Finally, because of the numerous surviving inscriptions and literary texts, such as Andocides's *On the Peace* and the last two comedies of Aristophanes, we know a great deal about Athenian democracy and its major debates during this war. This paper demonstrates that Athens from the mid-390s was not, as it is often claimed, a decadent city-state that had been completely exhausted by the Peloponnesian War. Instead, this paper shows that this city-state, in the course of a new ten-year war, became a power that could again claim hegemony over other Greeks.

**Annabel Florence (Queensland)**

**Athens after the Defeat: Financing Wars from 399 to 369 BC**

Claude Mossé famously argued that the inability of postwar Athens to manage well the financing of war led to its irreversible decline. Needless to say, we have moved on since the publication of her *La Fin de la démocratie athénienne* sixty years ago. In recent decades, much

research has demonstrated that Athenian public finances recovered quickly in the early fourth century, which ended up being a period of wide-ranging financial reforms. The first thirty years of the century saw Athens fighting more often than previously, sending its infantry and navy on long campaigns across the eastern Mediterranean. Nevertheless, the old idea persists that in order to finance this new surge in warfare Athens relied on Persia's benevolence, on the heavy taxation of Athenian citizens and their allies, and the violent extracting of money from other states by their generals on campaign. This paper incorporates new findings about the financial reforms of early-fourth-century Athens into the study of its contemporaneous wars. The financial decisions of the Athenian *dēmos* are thus considered alongside the details of actual military campaigns. The paper's major finding is that by introducing financial innovations or by reforming others already in place, postwar Athens was able to draw significantly on its own financial resources to pay for wars.

**Vincent Gabrielsen (Copenhagen)**

### **The Athenian Navy in the Fourth Century BC: Restoration, Incrementation and Transformation**

Claude Mossé's overall judgement on the Athenian navy in the fourth century BC, particularly her appraisal of the navy's role in the narrative about Athens's decline, consisted of a positive as well as a negative element. On the one hand, Mossé acknowledged that Athens had continued to possess a strong fleet, but on the other hand, she maintained that lack of adequate financial resources had inhibited the Athenians from making full use of the fleet's potential. For her, the patient, so to speak, was not the fleet *per se*, but the attending financial infrastructure. Putting that diagnosis to the test, accordingly, has become a central concern of subsequent appraisals of Athens's naval organisation in the fourth century, focussing, as they do, on the characteristics distinguishing systems of naval resource acquirement and management as well as on their effectiveness. To some extent, this paper continues this line of inquiry. However, in pursuing its principal aim of registering continuities and changes in the naval organisation, it steers clear of the decline discourse – a construct attributable originally to Demosthenes. The focus here is instead on three parallel-running but also intersecting processes: restoration, incrementation and transformation. All three, this paper argues, were outgrowths of both public and private initiatives. And all three transformed, not only Athens's way of deploying its fleet, but also Athenian society and its economy. By 325 BC, in conclusion, the navy had grown as strong as – indeed arguably stronger than – that of 431. Yet, the institutional setting of which it consisted differed substantially from its fifth-century predecessor.

**Lucy Jackson (Durham)**

### **Literary Itineraries: Athenian Soft Power and Cultural Expansion in the Fourth Century BC**

Despite the assertions of many in, and beyond, the Paris School, it is not hard to show how Athenian literary creations continued to innovate and to push boundaries after 404 BC. From the fragments of poems and plays, and the descriptions of literary performance in speeches, dialogues and treatises, we can see a vivid landscape. The striking image Plato gives in his *Laws*, which was written in the 350s, of a crowd of choruses delivering a 'deluge of blasphemy' on the holy altars with 'words and rhythms and overwrought melodies' signals how performed literature could still provoke a strong reaction amongst more conservative Athenians (800c5-d4). More interesting, however, is the question of how these innovations can be put into dialogue with political and social concerns of the time. 'Athenian' literature was not kept for Athenians alone but was created by, and for, people across the Mediterranean basin. New theatrical festivals were set up as part of Athens's new imperial projects, and the likelihood of touring productions of tragedies and comedies means that theatrical literature, at least, took on an even greater international flavour than had been true for that of



Aeschylus and Sophocles, for example. This paper will show how literary production flourished as part of the statecraft, the economic success and the imperial activity of fourth-century Athens.

**Aggelos Kapellos (Athens/Ioannina)**

**From Villain to Hero: Conon's Victory at Cnidus in the Attic Orators**

This paper argues that although the Athenian orators were initially very negative about Conon when they first learnt of his victory at Cnidus while he was serving the Persian king, their treatment of him changed after Athens had created the Second Athenian League in the 370s BC. It did not matter anymore that Conon had served in the Persian navy in the past, now they were looking for heroes among past Athenian generals who could help them to justify their claims for a new leading role in Greece after the Peloponnesian War. Conon's statue in the *agora* ('civic centre') as well as a second statue of him on the Acropolis next to the one of his son, Timotheus, helped the Athenians to re-imagine Conon as a stereotypical military leader of the past who had fought for the hegemony of Athens and had defeated the Spartans. Persia's role now seems to have been forgotten. The orators strengthened the positive image of Conon that the Athenians had by finding a continuation of his success in that of Timotheus, who had also defeated the Spartans in 375. At the end of this process of rhetorical aggrandisement, the orators had created a commonplace in which Conon was celebrated as a great heroic general of the past.

**James Kierstead (Wellington)**

**The Evolution of Athenian Democracy after 404 BC**

The last forty years have witnessed a sustained debate about what happened to Athenian democracy after the Peloponnesian War. Immediately after the democracy's restoration, the postwar *dēmos* began reforming their political and legal institutions. One side of this debate interprets these reforms as making Athens less democratic. For Martin Ostwald, for example, they brought about a change 'from popular sovereignty to the rule of the law', while Raphael Sealey saw them as a shift from democracy to republicanism. Mogens Herman Hansen has long argued that they led to a more 'moderate' form of democracy, while Federica Carugati for her part writes of a new liberal-democratic constitution. On the other side of this debate there are those who see no diminution in the power of the *dēmos*. Josiah Ober has long been certain that the democracy of postwar Athens was no less democratic, while Edward Harris interprets the reforms after 404 as a continuation of the longstanding commitment of the Athenian people to popular government and the rule of law. This paper seeks to advance this debate by looking closely at the political and legal reforms themselves. It argues that they on balance did not make Athens less democratic nor transform it into a republic. It is true that the new constitution was different from the fifth-century one, especially with the regard to the assembly's ability to take decisions whenever it pleased. Whether this diluted democracy touches on one of the deepest questions in contemporary democratic theory: to what extent can sovereigns bind themselves, like Odysseus to the mast, while still retaining their sovereignty?

**Lara O'Sullivan (Western Australia)**

**Athenian Military Performance after 338 BC: The Case-Study of the Lamian War**

It is easy to paint a picture of Athenian military decline in the years after the defeat of Chaeronea. Contemporary orators bemoaned the humbling of Athens's status and of its military ambitions (e.g. Aeschines 3.134). The failure of Athens to mobilise in support of Thebes in 335 BC or of Agis in 331 seemingly lend weight to such negative characterisations. The veracity of such assessments has, however, begun to come under question, for example through an increasing

acknowledgement of the rhetorical shaping of such political laments. This paper extends this questioning to the most important of Athens's mobilisations in the period from 338 to 307: the Lamian War. It will be argued that the scale of the political ramifications of the loss have encouraged an unduly negative assessment, with some even seeing the naval defeat at Amorgos in 322 as the antithesis of the victory at Salamis in 480. Close consideration of the literary traditions and of the naval records, combined with a questioning of the assumptions that have underpinned our reading of the naval phase of the war, permit a more nuanced interpretation of Athens's efforts. Indeed, the generally lacklustre showing of Athenian forces under the subsequent oligarchies may stem more from the impacts of the restriction of democracy and mass disenfranchisement that followed the Athenian capitulation than from any significant destruction of Athens's military capability in the war itself.

**Mischa Piekosz (Queensland)**

***Naukraroi* and *Naukrariai*: The Purpose of One of the Oldest Athenian Institutions**

One of the oldest attested institutions in archaic Athens was the *naukrariai* – units of some sort that were led by so-called *naukraroi*. These leaders, according to Herodotus, had played a crucial role in ending the occupation of the Acropolis by Cylon and his co-conspirators and in their subsequent murders around 630 BC. However, it remains hotly debated what the competencies of the *naukraroi* precisely were and what purpose the *naukrariai* served. In this longstanding debate, one side argues, primarily on the basis of etymological analysis, that the *naukraroi* were responsible for the provision of ships to the *polis* ('city-state'). This side holds that they may have also provided horses and even served as military officers. According to this side, the *naukrariai* themselves were the regions where taxes were raised to pay for these military activities. The other side of this debate argues that the *naukraroi* were above all else local administrators, as the nearest contemporary evidence suggests, and that the *naukrariai* were regional subdivisions which would later be subsumed by Cleisthenes's demes. As local administrators, the *naukraroi* collected taxes and were responsible for the maintenance of local public property, possibly including religious sanctuaries. This debate is vitally important for our understanding of Athenian warfare before the democratic reforms of Cleisthenes. My paper aims to adjudicate it by systematically reviewing the ancient testimonia for the Athenian *naukraroi* and *naukrariai*.

**Joseph Roisman (Colby)**

**Generals and Generalship in the Fourth-Century Orators**

Athenian generalship has been widely discussed by ancient historians, including by the great Claude Mossé, whom this conference rightly honours. However, this historiography has paid relatively little attention to how generals were depicted in fourth-century oratory, even though such depictions tell us about the perceptions and the expectations that the postwar *dēmos* had of their military leaders. The first part of this paper investigates Athenian orators's positive and, much more common, negative depictions of generals and their rhetorical manipulations of commonplaces about military leadership. Also investigated is what speakers said about the relationship between *rhētores* ('public speakers') and generals and about their respective responsibilities for military failures. The paper's second part focusses on the realities of serving as a general in the fourth century as it was reflected in two famous speeches. Lysias's *For the Soldier* (9) and Apollodorus's *Against Polycles* ([Dem.] 50) deal respectively with a soldier's and a trierarch's acts of defiance and the generals's largely mild reactions to them. The paper suggests that power, authority and discipline were negotiated between the generals and those under his command in ways that went beyond military hierarchy and regulations.

### **Dorothea Rohde (Bielefeld)**

#### **More Than a Recovery: Political Decisions and Economic Improvements in Postwar Athens**

The Peloponnesian War resulted in only a short-term downturn for the Athenian economy. It turned out that Attica's arable land had been far less damaged in the long run than it first appeared immediately after the defeat in 404 BC. The situation was similar with maritime trade: trade routes had not collapsed, with the Piraeus remaining the most important trading port in the eastern Mediterranean. In addition, especially from the middle of the fourth century, the *dēmos* introduced innovative reforms that had a positive impact on the private economy. These included the re-introduction and expansion of *misthos* ('pay') for public service. This more extensive state pay – along with the securing of the foreign grain supply – made it easier for all Athenians to make ends meet and therefore encouraged them to invest more in businesses and/or farms. New special law-courts for credit matters and maritime affairs facilitated the fast resolution of private economic disputes. Similarly, large-scale public building projects after 350 provided wages to many Athenian residents. The expansion of the state's festival program as well as the professionalisation of theatre in the later fourth century attracted international visitors, stimulating further the local economy. The fact that elite Athenians still had to perform expensive liturgies and to pay taxes forced them to become efficient businessmen. Therefore, it is not by chance that Plato speaks, mid-century, of the 'love for making money' as a human trait. The elite's efficient management of their private ventures even became the subject of a new special genre: economic literature. Thanks in part to decisions of the *dēmos* ('people'), the private economy of postwar Athens not only recovered but flourished. In turn, this resulted in a level of inequality that remained in comparison to other historical societies and in an increase in public expenditure.

### **Annie Schnapp-Gourbeillon (Paris)**

#### **The Beautiful Career-Path of Claude Mossé**

Claude Mossé was among the first female professors in France to specialise in Ancient History. Although she obtained brilliant results in History in her *agrégation* ('higher teaching diploma'), Claude chose to keep studying, not contemporary history, which was more fashionable in the 1940s, but what she had cherished in high school: the history of ancient Greece. Her first steps as a young ancient historian were quite similar to those of Jean-Pierre Vernant, with whom she would constantly work. The two of them sought out a space that was more open to research than what was allowed by the Marxism that was in its ascendancy. Claude was certainly a Marxist when she wrote her doctoral thesis and for quite a long time remained 'a fellow traveller' of the French Communist Party. Nevertheless, in the fullness of time, she did reconsider a number of the theories that *La Fin de la démocratie athénienne* had elaborated. Her boundless curiosity probably accounts for the variety and the remarkable number of her published works. The books and articles that appeared with impressive regularity were a rare combination of scholarly rigour and high-quality popularisation. It is no surprise that they reached a much larger audience than is usually the case for research-related works. As a politically engaged historian, Claude participated in the bold experiment that was the Vincennes University Centre, which would later become the University of Paris VIII. Among the Centre's innovations was putting management into the hands of academics themselves. Claude knew well how to convince them of Ancient History's vital importance. She was an enthusiastic teacher, who was close to her students. For me, working beside her throughout her career at Vincennes was an unforgettable experience. As a former student and colleague of Claude, I am going to reflect on her unique and beautiful career, her intellectual collaborations in and outside France, and her personal engagement in public life.

**Adam Schwartz (Copenhagen)**

**“Not diminished, But Greater and better: Athenian Hoplites in the Fourth Century”**

The widespread notion that Athens went into a steep decline in the fourth century was prompted in no small part by Claude Mossé. For her, this decline had a clear military dimension: the disastrous setbacks and losses in both materiel and manpower during the Peloponnesian War caused a general defeatism among fourth-century Athenians, reduced drastically their willingness to serve in the armed forces and undermined the performance of such armies or fleets as they were able to mobilise. This seemed to fit the traditional idea that postwar Athens had increasingly to turn to mercenaries to fight her wars. This paper argues that the efforts of Athenian hoplites after 404 cast doubt on this notion. Throughout the fourth century, Athenians continued to enrol in the hoplite arm and to serve regularly in wars. When Athens was victorious, it was often due to the courage of these hoplites. What is more, the postwar *dēmos* initiated military reforms to facilitate Athenian hoplite success: in the 370s or 360s, they introduced a new conscription method for hoplites, which speeded up mobilisation and ensured that the burden of military service was shared more equitably. And in the 330s, the *dēmos* backed a substantial increase in the public training of future hoplites. This new training, as well as a new public subsidisation of equipment for hoplites, resulted in an increase in the proportion of Athenians willing and able to serve. This further undermines the downbeat assessment that Mossé had of fourth-century Athens at war.

**Nicholas Sekunda (Gdańsk)**

**Athenian Peltasts in the Fourth Century BC**

This paper gathers and analyses the mainly fourth-century evidence for Athenian peltasts. In some cases, these ‘peltasts of the Athenians’ were mercenaries, but in other cases they were demonstrably Athenian citizens. This was particularly the case with rowers who served on Athenian triremes, who were called upon to serve on land as peltasts, as well as propel the triremes when at sea. It will be suggested that ephebic service at Athens stretched back far earlier than the so-called ephebic reform of Epicrates in 335 BC. Xenophon in his *Ways and Means*, which was written about 355, contrasted those assigned to exercise under the gymnasiarchs in the torch-races, those assigned to perform garrison duty in the garrisons and those serving as peltasts patrolling (*peripolein*) the countryside (52). I suggest that, before (as after) 335, ephebic service was performed over two years, the first in physical training in *gymnasia* (‘athletics-fields’), and the second either, if the ephebe’s family was capable of supplying him with a hoplite panoply, in the garrisons, or, if not, patrolling the countryside as a peltast. The latter were termed *peripoloi* (‘patrollers’) and were commanded by *peripolarkhoi*. *Peripoloi* are first mentioned by Thucydides in connection with events of 411 (8.92.2, 5). Aeschines states (2.167): ‘As soon as I passed out of boyhood I became a *peripolos* of this *khōra* (‘countryside’) for two years; and I shall call my *sunephēboi* (‘fellow ephebes’) and our officers as witnesses.’ Aeschines performed his ephebic service in the early 370s. Ephebic service in the *peripoloi* by naval crews was largely instrumental in the re-emergence of Athenian naval power in what has been called the new Athenian thalassocracy.

**Ian Worthington (Macquarie)**


**The Athenian War Effort against Philip II**

Philip II not so slowly and very steadily built Macedonia into a superpower, in the process expanding its borders to the Hellespont and his own influence deep into Greece. The Greeks may not have anticipated that he would conquer them, though his actions by the later 340s BC ought to have alerted them to that. Certainly, Demosthenes had been warning his fellow Athenians of the



threat from Philip for some time – his *On the Chersonese* and the third and fourth *Philippics* live up to Philip's apparent remark that Demosthenes's speeches 'were like soldiers because of their warlike power' (Plutarch *Moralia* 845d). Yet, the Athenians largely ignored Demosthenes until, as Chaeronea in 338 showed, it was too late. Their attitude contrasts with their fifth-century ancestors, who accepted, for example, Pericles's warnings about the threat from Sparta (Thucydides 1.140-4, 2.13) and waged war against that state. The Athenians were not averse to mobilising troops in the fourth century either – think of the military aid to Thebes in 379/8 to expel the Spartan garrison or the expedition of Nausicles in 352 to block Philip at Thermopylae. Why then did they not try to defeat the king until it was too late? Various explanations have been advanced: no state could combat Philip's inexorable advance; he moved fast and his intentions were opaque; citizens did not want to fight but rely on mercenaries; fourth-century democracy was a military failure so Philip's success was unsurprising, which, of course, was Mossé's view; or, perhaps, the people had tired of what Joseph Roisman aptly describes as Demosthenes's 'rhetoric of war'. I think more can be said on this matter and that the Athenians's reaction to the 'foreign' threat from Macedonia needs to be compared and contrasted more with their fifth-century counterparts as they faced off against the Spartans and previous Macedonian kings. I highlight these connections to show that the people's perception of threats and a 'when the situation demands it' attitude explain their approach to Philip II.

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**Figure 5: British soldiers pose in front of the Erechtheum in October 1944.**

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8 December 2022

Dear David

**Fourth-Century Athens at War: After Claude Mossé**

I have read your outline of this proposed volume and would like to express very strong interest in considering it for Cambridge University Press in due course. The topic is a very important one and the planned chapters look strong. Moreover, you have already demonstrated your editorial skills in a book published with the Press, with a second about to be presented to the Syndics.

All good wishes

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## Book Prospectus

### FOURTH-CENTURY ATHENS AT WAR: AFTER CLAUDE MOSSÉ

Edited by David M. Pritchard and Ian Worthington

This edited book will be a major contribution to the rewriting of Athenian history after 404 BC. Traditionally ancient historians understood the fourth century as a period of steep decline. The great French historian, C. Mossé, did the most to promote the view that Athens never recovered from the Peloponnesian War, falling into a serious economic and political crisis. Mossé also argued that this decline had a striking military dimension. The Athenians now increasingly left the fighting of their wars to mercenaries. Because of a chronic lack of funds, they could no longer defend themselves properly and had to turn a blind eye to the violent fundraising of their generals. The result was that Athens could not stop the rise of the regional state of Macedon. The last forty years have witnessed a sustained critique of the traditional understanding. We now know that fourth-century Athens recovered economically and politically. Nonetheless, we still do not have a new comprehensive assessment of the military record of postwar Athens. *Fourth-Century Athens at War: After Claude Mossé* provides this new detailed picture. It brings together leading ancient historians from France and across the world to study all aspects of Athenian warfare after 404. This book will put the study of the warmaking of fourth-century Athens on an entirely new footing.

It is quite common for there to be a change in the understanding of a period after a major conflict. Europe after the Second World War is a good example (Judt 2005). In 1945, Europeans had no reason to be positive about the period ahead. Millions were dead and millions of others were refugees. Cities everywhere were in ruins, while Europe's empires had begun to unravel. But the several decades that followed transformed the European perception of their postwar period. There was a long economic boom and democracies were re-established. European states embraced innovative cooperation so that war would never return. The result is that contemporary Europeans now perceive the period after 1945 as largely positive. The Peloponnesian War had no less of an adverse impact. In this major conflict, Athens lost half of its population and a vast empire. The traditional understanding of this ancient postwar period is completely different from what contemporary Europeans think of theirs. It holds that Athens went into a century of steep decline. In the 1980s, ancient historians began to question this understanding (e.g. Harding 1988). It increasingly seems that there are parallels between postwar Athens and Europe's recovery after 1945.

French ancient historians were largely responsible for promulgating the traditional understanding of fourth-century Athens. For them, this ancient Greek state peaked in the fifth century, when it dominated Greece militarily, perfected direct democracy and was a cultural innovator (Hartog 2007). In general, they held postwar Athens in contempt. For example, P. Vidal-Naquet argued that Athens, after 404, had lost all military dominance. For N. Loraux and C. Castoriadis, fourth-century Athenians were no longer capable of political reform or literary innovation. Yet, it was, without a doubt, Mossé who, with her *La Fin de la démocratie athénienne*, did the most to spread this understanding (Mossé 1962). In France, the reason for this decline was typically found in politics. Mossé, by contrast, who was still a traditional Marxist in the 1960s, located it in economics. The fifth-century empire, she argued, had suppressed the class struggle among Athenians because it had given thousands of the poor farmland overseas. When they were forced home, after the empire's loss, they, along with the rest of the lower class, became destitute, since the war had ruined Attica's agriculture and urban economy. As they became poorer, the *dēmos* ('people') were no longer willing or even able to participate in public life. For Mossé, the growing gap between rich and poor also destroyed the capacity of democratic politics to resolve collective problems.

Mossé argued that Athenian warmaking declined no less steeply than other major public and private activities. Before *La Fin de la démocratie athénienne*, ancient historians had focussed on the increased Greek use of mercenaries in the fourth century (Burckhardt 1995). Mossé went well beyond them by giving a comprehensive analysis of fourth-century Athens at war (e.g. 1962: 313-32), which

proved to be highly influential (e.g. Hanson 1995). In her analysis, she took at face value what Demosthenes had claimed in the 350s and the 340s. As part of his ill-fated early attempts to shame the *dēmos* into fighting Philip II, Demosthenes made out that contemporary Athenians were much worse at war than their fifth-century ancestors. For Mossé, the bedrock of the hoplite corps, before 404, had been prosperous lower-class farmers. But the general economic decline destroyed this social stratum as well as leaving all non-elite citizens much poorer. As a consequence, Mossé claimed, the *dēmos* increasingly refused to serve in wars, leaving the fighting of them to mercenaries. They also refused to raise taxes at home to pay for these foreign troops. Rather, they taxed as heavily as possible the Greek states in their new league, which, according to Mossé, soon became more exploitative than the fifth-century empire. The *dēmos* licensed generals to engage in piracy and pillaging. Such violent fundraising made other Greeks even less willing to join military coalitions led by Athens. By asking their generals to do more independently, Athenian democracy also inevitably lost control of them. *La Fin de la démocratie athénienne* concluded that fourth-century Athens could rarely field adequate armies or fleets. This meant that it would inevitably fail to stop Macedon's conquest of Greece.

Forty years of scholarship has called into question the traditional understanding of fourth-century Athens. The Peloponnesian War, it is now clear, had much less of an impact on Attica's agriculture (Hanson 1998), while the urban economy rebounded quickly (e.g. Strauss 1986). By the early fourth century, Athens was a major military power within the Greek world (Harding 1995), and the *dēmos* were once again supporting political reforms and cultural innovations (e.g. Hall 2007). Therefore, what fourth-century Athens experienced was probably more akin to the recovery that Europe has had since 1945. It is true that this revisionist history has also challenged elements of Mossé's analysis of fourth-century Athens at war. For example, L. A. Burckhardt continues to demonstrate that Athenian citizens, after 404, remained the backbone of the armed forces, with mercenaries only ever being a supplement (Burckhardt 2018). He rightly raises doubts about the reliability of Demosthenes as a witness to military history. For his part, G. L. Cawkwell argued that fourth-century Athens was usually capable of launching adequate fleets for protecting its vital interests (Cawkwell 1984). When they created the second Athenian league in the 370s, the *dēmos* famously promised not to repeat the exploitative practices of the fifth-century empire. In the 1980s, J. Cargill demonstrated that the *dēmos* had probably kept these promises, turning the league into a major innovation (Cargill 1981). Nonetheless, in spite of these challenges to Mossé, we still lack a new comprehensive interpretation of the warmaking of fourth-century Athens. The principal goal of this edited volume is to draw the new detailed picture of this military record.

Another goal of *Fourth-Century Athens at War: After Claude Mossé* is to address a serious ambiguity about the military dominance of fifth-century Athens. It is quite certain that Athenian democracy itself was a major reason for this military success (Pritchard 2019: 1-27). But we still do not know how important it was relative to the two other major reasons: the huge demographic advantage that fifth-century Athens enjoyed and the enormous public income that it got from the Athenian empire. Here this edited volume's new picture of its military performance in the fourth century will be vitally important. Postwar, Athens probably had the same population as in the sixth century, when it was not a democracy. After the defeat, it no longer had a tribute-bearing empire. Consequently, sustained military success on the part of fourth-century Athenians would suggest that democracy probably had been the most important reason for the fifth-century military dominance. Military success over two centuries would seal the case for the positive impact of democracy on Athenian warmaking. It would refute the claim of Mossé that democracy was a major reason why postwar Athens failed militarily.

The ancient historians in this edited volume come from France, Australia and several other countries. *Fourth-Century Athens at War: After Claude Mossé* groups their 17 chapters into 4 sections. The first section, 1. Military Branches, considers the reforms that the postwar *dēmos* enacted in relation to different groups of combatants. In order to assess Mossé's claim that such reforms were ineffective, it also reassesses how each military corps or group of combatants performed in actual

campaigns. Adam Schwartz (Copenhagen) is undertaking this for hoplites, Jérémy Clément (Nanterre) for horsemen, Vincent Gabrielson (Copenhagen) for the navy and Nick Sekunda (Gdańsk) for light troops. David M. Pritchard (Queensland) will study the common ground between all these military reforms. The next section, 2. Military Practices, reconsiders different general aspects of Athenian warfare after the Peloponnesian War. The fourth-century democracy has often been criticised for doing too little or too much to control its generals. Joseph Roisman (Colby) and Aggelos Kapellos (Academy of Athens) will review this vital principal–agent relationship across the century. The postwar *dēmos* also constantly reformed the financing of war. Using case-studies, Annabel Florence (Queensland) is going reassess the effectiveness of these reforms. In the fifth century, Athens had unprecedented fortifications and was Greece’s leading besieger of cities. Julien Baldacini (Nantes/Paris) will consider whether it maintained this record of innovation into the fourth century.

*Fourth-Century Athens at War: After Claude Mossé* also studies the performance of the Athenians in specific campaigns. In the third section, 3. Fourth-Century Wars, Marie Durnerin (Toulouse) will thus reconsider what Athens got out of the Corinthian War. In spite of Cargill’s historical revisionism, there is still debate about whether the second Athenian league represented a change from, or a return to, fifth-century Athenian imperialism. In adjudicating this debate, Svatoslav Dmitriev (Ball State) will focus especially on Athenian campaigns in the 360s and the 350s. For Mossé, the inability of Athens to stop Philip II put beyond doubt that the fourth-century democracy was a military failure. For other ancient historians, no Greek *polis* (‘city-state’) had the capacity to stop this king after he had worked out how to tap Macedon’s vast population and financial resources. As an expert on the Athens–Macedonia relationship, Ian Worthington (Macquarie) is well placed to arbitrate this core debate about fourth-century Athens. In doing so, he is reassessing the campaigns that Athens waged against Philip II. It is often forgotten that the Athenian *dēmos* waged wars after their defeat at the battle of Chaeronea. Lara O’Sullivan will thus focus on how they fared in the Lamian War and other campaigns after 338.

The warmaking of fourth-century Athens did not happen in a vacuum. Therefore, the book’s fourth section, 4. Comparative Performances, explores how fourth-century Athenians fared in other major public and private activities. After 404, the *dēmos* introduced just as many political and economic reforms as they did military ones. James Kierstead (Wellington) explores why they extensively reformed their government and whether, in doing so, they made it more or less democratic. Dorothea Rohde (Bielefeld) is going to reconsider the economic recovery of fourth-century Athens and the extent to which it was due to the *dēmos*’s economic reforms. Mossé was not alone in taking the supposedly poor quality of fourth-century Athenian literature as further proof of a general decline. Lucy Jackson (Durham) draws the book to a close by problematising this downbeat assessment of postwar Athenian culture. Jackson reminds us that, in the fourth century, tragic and comic poets continued to push the boundaries of theatre, while public oratory across all genres developed in leaps and bounds.

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